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Abstract
This paper studies the impact of financial constraints on exporter dynam-
ics, and the role of financial intermediation in international trade. We propose
a two-country general equilibrium model economy in which entrepreneurs and
lenders engage in long-term credit relationships. Financial markets are endoge-
nously incomplete because of private information, and financial constraints arise as
a consequence of optimal financial contracts. In equilibrium, competitive financial
intermediaries actively channel individuals’ short-term deposits to fund a diversi-
fied portfolio of long-term risky firms. Young and small firms operate below their
efficient level, and their financial constraint is relaxed as the entrepreneur’s claim
to future cash-flows increases. Consistent with empirical regularities, there is a
substantial year-to-year transition in and out of export markets for smaller firms,
and new exporters account only for a small share of total exports. Established ex-
porters are less likely to exit export markets and tend to experience slower, albeit
more stable growth.
Keywords: private information, dynamic optimal contracts, exporter dynam-
ics, financial intermediation
JEL classifications: F10, D82, L14
∗This version: September 13, 2013. An early draft circulated as A Theory of Firm Dynamics and
International Trade. The authors thank Espen Henriksen, Peter Rupert, Finn Kydland, Ina Simonovska,
John Stachurski, Robert Feenstra, Rodney Ramcharan, Nathan Foley-Fisher, Borghan Narajabad and
the seminar participants at the Australian National University, University of Melbourne, UC Davis, UC
Irvine, UC Santa Barbara, Bank of Canada, Federal Reserve Board, Royal Economic Society meeting
2012, Society for Economic Dynamics meeting 2012, and the International Conference on Computational
Economics and Finance 2012 for helpful comments and suggestions. We thank Eric Hardy for excellent
research assistance, and the LAEF for generously hosting us in April 2012. The views expressed in this
paper do not reflect the views of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System or its staff.
†till gross@carleton.ca. Department of Economics, Carleton University.
‡stephane.h.verani@frb.gov, corresponding author. Federal Reserve Board. Mail Stop 145. Consti-
tution Ave NW, Washington, DC 20551. Tel: 1-(202)-912-7972. Fax: 1-(202)-475-6363
1
1 Introduction
There is substantial empirical evidence that the financial conditions faced by small and
young firms play an important role in shaping their growth. This is widely interpreted
as indirect evidence of frictions in financial markets, since small- and medium-sized firms
tend to be more reliant on external financing, which is mostly debt.1
Exporters are rare, and most of them are small. In the United States, for exam-
ple, less than 5 percent of all firms exported some of their production in 2010. More
than 97 percent of these exporters were small- and medium-sized firms (500 employees
or less), which only accounted for about 34 percent of total exports.2 In contrast to
large exporters, there is substantial year-to-year transition in and out of export markets
for smaller firms. New exporters are typically small relative to the average exporter
and frequently stop exporting after one year. New exporters are more likely to exit
export markets and to experience faster, but also more volatile growth than established
exporters (Bernard and Jensen (2004), Ruhl and Willis (2008)).
Hysteresis in export markets suggests the presence of fixed costs of entry (e.g., Das,
Roberts, and Tybout (2007), Paravisini, Rappoport, Schnabl, and Wolfenzon (2011)),
thereby suggesting that participation in international trade may require even greater
access to external financing. This in turn could imply that the export decisions of small-
and medium-sized firms are sensitive to the availability of credit; and the widespread
use of relatively expensive trade credit among exporters could suggest that many face
binding credit constraints (Antras and Foley (2011)).3
This paper seeks answers to three questions: How does access to credit affect firms’
1See Hubbard (1998) and Stein (2003) for surveys.
2http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/Press-Release/edb/2010/text.txt
3Minetti and Zhu (2011) find evidence that access to credit has an impact on firm export status,
and Amiti and Weinstein (2011) find that access to credit has an impact on the intensity of exports.
Other studies find a positive association between a firm’s financial health and its export status (e.g.,
Greenaway and Kneller (2007), Muuls (2008) and Manova, Wei, and Zhang (2011), and Bellone, Musso,
Nesta, and Schiavo (2010)). An important challenge in any such analysis stems from difficulties in
directly measuring the extent of firm financial constraints and in separating the effect of credit supply
from credit demand on export decisions. For example, it could also be the case that firms’ export status
has an important impact on their financial health by giving them access to a larger market and further
risk diversification.
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decisions to export? How do credit relationships shape the growth of new exporters?
And what is the role of financial intermediaries in allocating capital to finance interna-
tional trade? We argue that financial frictions that disproportionally affect small and
young firms are likely to play an important role in shaping exporter dynamics, and that
the allocation of credit in the economy depends on the distribution of firm character-
istics. Accordingly, we propose a theory in which firm financial constraints arise as a
consequence of endogenously incomplete financial markets, and in which the allocation of
capital in the economy is consistent with the aggregate effects of all individual decisions.
Small and young firms are generally more opaque to external scrutiny. This opaque-
ness creates an informational asymmetry between lenders and entrepreneurs leading to
adverse selection and moral hazard problems. As a result, competitive banks may choose
to either ration the supply of credit to young and small firms instead of increasing the
price of credit to clear the market (e.g., Stiglitz and Weiss (1981)), or to reduce the im-
pact of private information through repeated interaction and monitoring of firms (e.g.,
Diamond (1984, 1991), Rajan (1992), and Allen and Gale (1999)). Quadrini (2004) and
Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006) show that long-term financial contracts that are con-
strained efficient under private information can help account for some of the empirical
regularities on firm dynamics – firm entry and exit, and the mean and variance of firm
growth.
Building on this research and Dixit and Stiglitz’s (1977) model of monopolistic com-
petition, we propose a general equilibrium two-country model economy in which en-
trepreneurs and lenders enter into dynamic lending relationships that are constrained
efficient under private information. Endogenous borrowing constraints arise as the out-
come of the optimal lending contract. Our general equilibrium framework provides a
novel link between industry dynamics, the balance sheets of lenders, and aggregate con-
ditions, thereby relating financial intermediation to international trade.
Our theory lies at the intersection of corporate finance, international trade, and
macroeconomics. The effect of financing constraints due to private information on firm
selection into export markets is also studied by Feenstra, Li, and Yu (2011), who find
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strong support for the theory in Chinese plant-level data. Related research on ex-
porter dynamics has modeled exporter dynamics as the outcome of learning as in Eaton,
Eslava, Jinkins, Krizanc, and Tybout (2012), investment in risky R&D as in Atkeson
and Burstein (2010), and persistent idiosyncratic shocks to productivity (e.g., Ruhl and
Willis (2008), Arkolakis (2011), Alessandria and Choi (2011), and Kohn, Leibovici, and
Szkup (2011)). Models of monopolistic competition in which firms face uncertainty
about their productivity and fixed export costs account well for the cross-section of ex-
porters and the pattern of intra-industry trade (e.g., Melitz (2003) and Chaney (2008)).
Dynamic extensions of this class of heterogeneous firm models in which firms experience
persistent productivity shocks are, however, less successful in accounting for exporter
dynamics. In particular, these models cannot account well for the facts that sales of
new exporters are more volatile than those of established exporters, and that the sur-
vival rate of continuing exporters rises over time. Additionally, the large market entry
costs proposed in these models are at odds with the observation that many firms export
for short periods on a very small scale (Ruhl and Willis (2008), Eaton, Eslava, Krizan,
Kugler, and Tybout (2011)).
A key difference in our framework is that selection into export markets does not
depend on a firm’s (expected) productivity as in Melitz (2003)– expected productivity is
constant in our model. Rather, selection into export markets depends on a firm’s present
value of expected discounted cash flows, whose evolution is governed by the financial
contract and the firm’s performance over time.4
In the model, entrepreneurs are born with a blueprint to start a long-lived monop-
olistic firm. A firm requires an initial fixed investment to start, and working capital to
pay for factor inputs and trade costs before production takes place. New entrepreneurs
do not have sufficient wealth to start a firm, and must seek financing from competitive
financial intermediaries. Financial frictions arise because financial intermediaries can-
not directly observe the revenue generated by the firms they are financing, and must
4There is widespread empirical evidence that exporters are more productive than domestic firms, and
we abstract from productivity heterogeneity to focus on the role of financial constraints. In Section 7, we
discuss how firm productivity and financial market incompleteness may jointly shape exporter dynamics.
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instead rely on reports from creditor entrepreneurs. Financial intermediaries mitigate
the moral hazard by offering new entrepreneurs a long-term financing contract designed
to induce truthful reporting. The financial arrangement in our model is closely related to
that in Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006), and a financing constraint emerges as an out-
come of the optimal contract. Financial intermediaries actively engage in maturity and
risk transformation in a competitive financial market using workers’ and entrepreneurs’
short-term deposits to fund a diversified portfolio of long-term risky projects.
In equilibrium, new firms operate below their efficient level, and the financing con-
straint is relaxed as the entrepreneur’s claim to future cash-flows increases. Firms that
are able to service their debt for a sufficiently long time may borrow enough to pay
the trade costs and expand into international markets. New exporters are less finan-
cially constrained than domestic firms, but their growth continues to depend on their
performance each period until they become fully unconstrained. Importantly, poor per-
formance leads to a decline of the firm and may force it to exit export markets.
Consistent with empirical regularities on firm dynamics (e.g., Cooley and Quadrini
(2001)), the model implies that older and larger firms have on average lower and more
stable growth rates, and are more likely to survive; that smaller and younger firms pay
fewer dividends, and borrow and invest more; and that the investment of small firms is
more sensitive to cash flows. Consistent with empirical studies on exporters (e.g., Eaton,
Eslava, Kugler, and Tybout (2007) and Ruhl and Willis (2008)), our model implies that
exporters are larger in terms of sales and employment. New exporters account only for
a small share of total exports, and a large fraction of new exporters does not continue to
export in the following year. Continuing exporters are less likely to exit export markets
the longer they export, have larger and more stable sales, and generally reach their
efficient size in a few years.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model and
Section 3 describes the financial arrangement between investors and entrepreneurs and
Section 4 derives the properties of the optimal contract. Section 5 defines the general
equilibrium, and section 6 analyzes the model numerically. Section 7 discusses the main
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result and its relation to productivity and the effect of other sources of financial mar-
ket incompleteness. In particular, we disentangle the effect of moral hazard relative
to productivity by discussing an extension of our model in which firms face persistent
idiosyncratic shocks to their productivity. We also show how our mechanism differs im-
portantly from other source of financial market incompleteness, such as limited contract
enforcement. Section 8 concludes by presenting new facts on exporters’ finances and
lending relationships using the 2003 Survey of Small Business Finances with firm export
status from matched firms in the National Establishment Time-Series database. Proofs
of propositions and derivations are relegated to the Appendix.5
2 Model
Time is discrete, infinite, and each period is indexed by t. The world is comprised of
two, possibly symmetric, countries, each populated by a measure of workers and en-
trepreneurs. The agents’ career path is an endowment and cannot be altered. Countries
may trade intermediate goods, but capital can only be invested domestically.
2.1 Workers
Workers are born without wealth, and are endowed with one unit of time each period.
Following Blanchard (1985), workers survive into the next period with constant proba-
bility (1 − γw), and are instantly replaced by newborns upon death. Workers discount
the future at rate (1−γw)βˆ, and allocate their time between labor ht and leisure. Labor
is paid a wage wt, and workers use their income to buy the nume´raire consumption
good ct, and to insure against mortality risk by purchasing annuities dt+1 priced at p
a
t
6
Workers do not value bequests, and thus place all their savings in these claims. Workers
5Details of derivations and two extensions of the model are contained in an online appendix avail-
able at: https://sites.google.com/site/veranistephane/home/working-papers/Gross_Verani_
Trade_OnlineAppendix.pdf
6These annuities pay (1 + rt) units of consumption in the next period if the agent is alive, and zero
otherwise.
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assess their consumption-leisure decision according to
E0
∞∑
t=0
[(1− γw)βˆ]tu(ct, 1− ht), (1)
which they maximize subject to a budget constraint
ct + p
a
t dt+1 ≤ (1 + rt)dt + wtht , (2)
and dt+1 ≥ , where  is the workers’ natural borrowing limit.
2.2 Entrepreneurs
Entrepreneurs are born with a blueprint to produce an intermediate good ω ∈ Ω˜. En-
trepreneurs, like workers, are born without wealth, survive into the next period with
probability (1 − γe), and are instantly replaced upon exit. Entrepreneurs are risk-
neutral, and discount the future at the rate β. We assume entrepreneurs do not make
labor-leisure decisions, and instead devote a fixed fraction of their time to supervising
their firm. Entrepreneurs assess their consumption decision according to
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtct, (3)
where β =
(
1−γe
1+r
)
.7 Entrepreneurs do not take part in the annuity market, and consume
all their period income.
2.3 Financial intermediation
Financial intermediaries are risk-neutral and discount the future at the same rate as
entrepreneurs. Financial intermediaries maximize profit using short-term deposits from
workers and entrepreneurs to finance a portfolio of long-lived intermediate good produc-
ers. Perfect competition and constant returns to scale in the financial intermediation
7We are anticipating that the risk free rate rt is constant in the stationary equilibrium.
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sector imply that intermediaries can be own by any coalition of agents, letting us focus
on a representative financial intermediary without loss of generality.
2.4 Intermediate good production
Producing an intermediate good ω ∈ Ω˜ requires starting a firm. A firm requires an
initial investment I0 that is sunk, and per period working resources Rt to hire labor
and rent capital. The ω-th firm produces the ω-th good according to a neo-classical
production function G(kt, nt), where kt is the capital input and nt is the labor input.
We assume that the capital used in production in one period is fully depreciated at the
end of the period. An entrepreneur wishing to export must pay a fixed export cost IE
before production begins, and chooses the quantity qt and q
∗
t of goods to sell domestically
and abroad, respectively.8 The allocation of period working resources R must satisfy:
k + nw + 1(q∗>0)IE ≤ R , (4)
where 1(q∗>0) is an indicator function that is equal to 1 when q
∗ > 0. Furthermore, a
firm must ship (1 + IT ) units of this good to sell one unit of goods abroad. This is a
standard iceberg cost, and implies that the allocation of output between domestic and
export sales must satisfy:
q + q∗(1 + IT ) ≤ G(k, n) . (5)
The ω-th firm is a monopolist for its differentiated product, and takes the inverse
demand function for its product p(q) – price as a function of quantity – as given. Firm
status is indexed by i ∈ {D,E}, where D and E indicate that a firm sells to the domestic
market only, or to both the domestic and export market, respectively. The maximum
8In what follows, variables marked with an asterisk denote exported goods’ quantities and prices.
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revenue a firm can generate with resources R is:
Fi(R) = max
q,q∗,k,n
p(q)q + 1(i=E)p
∗(q∗)q∗
s.t. q + q∗(1 + IT ) ≤ G(k, n)
k + nw + 1(q∗>0)IE ≤ R .
(6)
We assume there exists a unique level of resources past which a firm can only maximize
its revenue by exporting some of its production. That is, we assume that there exists
Rdx such that FD(R) > FE(R) for all R < Rdx and FD(R) < FE(R) for all R > Rdx.
If no such level exists, trade is never profitable and the two countries do not trade. In
the appendix, we show that if Rdx exists, then the crossing point of FD(R) and FE(R)
is unique. A firm is terminated when the entrepreneur dies.9
2.5 Final good production
The final good is assembled by a large number of perfectly competitive firms using do-
mestically produced and imported intermediate goods, and a constant returns to scale
technology. Intermediate goods are imperfect substitutes, and final good producers
maximize profit taking the price of intermediates as given. As with financial intermedi-
aries, constant returns to scale and perfect competition in the final good market imply
zero-profits, and lets us concentrate on a representative final good producer.
2.6 Information
Revenues from the production of intermediate goods are subject to a sequence of in-
dependent and identically distributed idiosyncratic revenue shocks (θt)t≥0, so that en-
trepreneurs receive θtFi(Rt) for i = {D,E} after production takes place. We assume
that Pr(θt = 1) = 1 − Pr(θt = 0) = pi, so that the expected revenue in any period
9This assumption is convenient to capture other sources of exit not modeled explicitly and is sufficient
to obtain a stationary distribution of firms. See for instance Cooley and Quadrini (2001), Cooley,
Marimon, and Quadrini (2004), and Smith and Wang (2006).
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given a firm has resources R at its disposal is piFi(Rt) for i = {D,E}.10 A friction arises
because the realization of revenues are only observed by entrepreneurs, and lenders can
only learn about the firm performance and the realizations of the revenue shocks θt
through entrepreneurs’ reports, θˆt.
3 The optimal long-term financial contract
Denote the history of reports up to period t by ht = (θˆ1, . . . , θˆt). A contract is a set of
rules κt = {`t(ht−1), et(ht−1), Qt(ht−1), Rt(ht−1), τt(ht−1, θˆt)} that depends on the history
and the current report from the entrepreneur. Conditional on surviving, a firm is either
liquidated, `t(h
t−1), in which case the entrepreneur receives Qt(ht−1) and the financial
intermediary receives S − Q(ht−1), where S ≤ I0 is the salvage value, or it remains in
operation. If a firm is kept in operation, the contract specifies whether or not the firm
exports, et(h
t−1), and the size of the loan, Rt(ht−1). After production takes place and
revenues are realized, an entrepreneur makes a repayment τ(ht−1, θˆt) to the financial
intermediary conditional on his ex-post report θˆt.
A reporting strategy for an entrepreneur is a sequence of reports θˆ = {θˆt(θt)}, where
θt = (θ1, . . . , θt) is the true history of realizations of revenue shocks. After every his-
tory ht−1, the pair (κ, θˆ) implies an expected discounted cash flow Vt(κ, θˆ, ht−1) and
Bt(κ, θˆ, h
t−1) for the entrepreneur and the financial intermediary, respectively. A feasi-
ble and incentive compatible contract is optimal if it maximizes Bt(Vt) for every possible
Vt. Following Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006), we refer to Vt and Bt as equity and debt,
respectively, so that the joint surplus W (V ) = B(V ) + V is the value of the firm.11
Using the method of Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1990), the optimal contract
can be written recursively by using Vt as a state variable and by defining V
H
t and V
L
t as
promised continuation values. It follows that equity must satisfy the following accounting
10This revenue shock could for instance be interpreted as a demand shock (whether there is demand
for the product or not) or a productivity shock (whether productivity is 0 or 1).
11We refer the reader to Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006) for a more formal characterization of the
set of contracts.
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identity:
V = piFi(R)− τ(θˆ) + (R− k − nw − 1(q∗>0)IE) + β[piV H + (1− pi)V L] , (7)
which states that current period equity is equal to the expected net cash flow this
period plus the discounted expected equity next period. In order to induce truthful
reporting, incentive compatibility constraints are required. Since entrepreneurs who
receive a low shock do not have an incentive to report a high shock, there is only one
binding constraint:
Fi(R)− τ(θˆ = 1) + βV H ≥ Fi(R)− τ(θˆ = 0) + βV L . (8)
Limited liability requires entrepreneurs’ dividends to be non-negative, so that
τ(θˆ) ≤ 1θ=1Fi(R) + (R− k − nw − 1(q∗>0)IE) . (9)
In equilibrium, the financial intermediary provides resources to an intermediate good
firm such that R = k− nw− 1(q∗>0)IE. This implies that τ(θˆ = 0) = 0, and we simplify
the notation by letting τ(θˆ = 1) = τ . Conditional on surviving, the value of an i-type
firm is given by,
Ŵi(V ) = max
τ,R,V H ,V L
piFi(R)− (1 + r)R + β[(1− pi)W (V L) + piW (V H)]
s.t. (7), (8), and (9)
V H , V L ≥ 0.
(10)
There exists a region [VD, VE] within which a greater value of the joint surplus can be
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reached by allowing for a lottery on the export decision:12
Ŵ (V ) = max
δ∈[0,1],VD,VE
δŴE(VE) + (1− δ)ŴD(VD)
s.t. δVE + (1− δ)VD = V
VD, VE ≥ 0
(11)
where δ is the probability of entering (remaining in) export markets, and VD and VE
are the respective continuation values (within the same period) if the firm sells purely
domestically or also exports. Last, W (V ) takes into account the option of liquidating
the firm
W (V ) = max
α∈[0,1],Q,Vr
αS + (1− α)Ŵ (Vr)
s.t. αQ+ (1− α)Vr = V
Q, Vr ≥ 0
(12)
where α is the probability of liquidation and Vr is the continuation value when the firm
is not liquidated.13 Figure 1 summarizes the timing of events within one period, and
Proposition 3.1 summarizes some basic properties of the value function.
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
Proposition 3.1 The value function W (V ) is increasing and concave. Furthermore,
there exist values 0 < Vr < VD < VE < V˜ such that:
• W (V ) is linear for V ∈ [0, Vr] ∪ [VD, VE], equal to W˜ when V = V˜ and strictly
increasing when V ∈ [Vr, VD] ∪ [VE, V˜ )
• The firm is liquidated with probability α(V ) = (Vr − V )/Vr if V ∈ [0, Vr), and 0
otherwise
• The firm exports with probability 1 if V ∈ [VE, V˜ ], δ(V ) = (V − VD)/(VE − VD)
when V ∈ (VD, VE), and 0 otherwise
12See Proof of Proposition 3.1 in the appendix for more details.
13We implicitly assume that VD > Vr, which is is a necessary condition to obtain non-exporting firms.
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4 Properties of the optimal contract
Before proceeding to the definition of the general equilibrium, it is instructive to first
study the behavior of the firms and financial intermediary in partial equilibrium.14 Panel
(a) of Figure 2 plots the optimal value of the firm, W (V ), and the value to the inter-
mediary, B(V ), as a function of equity, V . A firm faces a binding borrowing constraint
whenever its equity is below V˜ = piFE(R˜)/(1−β), where R˜ is the unconstrained level of
resources. That is, R˜ is the level of resources that solves the static profit maximization
of the firm such that R˜ = argmaxR{piFE(R) − R(1 + r)}. New firms start at V0 ≤ V˜
(which is pinned down in general equilibrium), so that expected profits of the intermedi-
ary B(V0) cover the cost of the initial investment I0(1 + r). Smaller firms take on more
debt than larger firms, and firms with equity less than VD cannot borrow enough, or do
not find it profitable, to pay the trade costs.
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]
Firms’ access to credit and growth are determined by the evolution of their capi-
tal structure. Using constraints (7), (8) and (9), and solving for next period’s equity
conditional on the revenue report yields the following law of motion for equity:
V L(V ) =

V−piFD(R(V ))
β
if V ∈ [Vr, VD]
V−piFE(R(V ))
β
if V ∈ [VE, V˜ )
, (13)
and
V H(V ) =

V+(1−pi)FD(R(V ))
β
if V ∈ [Vr, VD]
min
{
V˜ , V+(1−pi)FE(R(V ))
β
}
if V ∈ [VE, V˜ )
. (14)
Panel (b) of Figure 2 summarizes the evolution of firm equity following a particular
sequence of revenue shocks. Small domestic firm may start exporting after receiving a
finite sequence of positive revenue shocks. New exporters are less financially constrained
than domestic firms, but their growth continues to be shaped by the optimal contract
14Numerical solutions were computed using the functional form assumptions and parameter values
from the calibration in Section 6 below.
13
and the revenue shocks as long as VE < V˜ . And from Proposition 4.1, firms grow on
average.
Proposition 4.1 Conditional on surviving, a firm grows on average. That is {V ′}t≥0
is a sub-martingale so that E(V ′|V ) ≥ V .
[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE]
Figure 3 plots the decision rules for loans, repayments, and dividends as a function of
equity. Due to risk-neutrality, joint surplus is maximized when equity grows fastest, so
dividends to the entrepreneur are optimally zero until the firm can no longer grow faster
by postponing dividends, which is when V H(V ) = V˜ . This implies that it is optimal
for the financial intermediary to set the entrepreneur’s repayments to τ(V ) = Fi(R(V ))
for i = {D,E} whenever V H(V ) < V˜ as it allows for the fastest accumulation of equity
toward the unconstrained level. Furthermore, the optimization problem takes place on
the convex set [0, V˜ ], which implies V H(V ) = V˜ whenever (V +(1−pi)Fi(R(V ))/β > V˜ .
From constraints (7) and (8):
τ(V ) =
 Fi(R(V )) if V H(V ) < V˜β(V˜ − V L(V )) if V H(V ) = V˜ , (15)
which implies that conditional on a high revenue shock, resource advancement R(V ) and
repayment τ(V ) increase with firm equity up until V H(V ) = V˜ . Past this threshold,
repayments start declining and dividend payments start increasing until they eventually
reach 0 and F (R), respectively. At this size, firm equity no longer changes, and the
borrowing constraint ceases forever. The value of an unconstrained firm is
W (V˜ ) = V˜ +B(V˜ ) =
piFE(R˜)
1− β −
R˜(1 + r)
1− β . (16)
Therefore, a firm is financially unconstrained when its entrepreneur has accumulated
enough capital through its repayments to the financial intermediary to finance the firm
14
operation at full scale in every period and under all contingencies at the current interest
rate.
Panel (c) of Figure 3 plots the investment rate conditional on receiving a high and
low revenue shock as a function of equity. Investment by constrained firms is always
positive after receiving a high shock, and always negative after receiving a low shock for
constrained firms. The investment of small firms, and therefore their cash flow, is also
more sensitive to revenue shocks than that of larger firms. Furthermore, there is a large
increase in investment once the firm becomes an exporter, with subsequent very high
possible disinvestment should the firm receive a low shock and exit export markets.
5 General equilibrium
The workers’ problem can be written recursively as
U(d) = max
d′,c,h
u(c, h) + (1− γw)βˆU(d′)
s.t. c+ (1− γw)d′ = (1 + r)d+ wh
d′ ≥ −
(17)
in which our assumptions on worker characteristics implies a stationary demographic,
and that the actuarially fair annuities are priced at the survival rate in equilibrium. Let
dj and hj be the deposits and hours worked of a j-period old worker.
15 Normalizing the
mass of workers to one and given our demographic assumption, it follows that aggregate
net-deposits D and hours worked H by workers each period are given by
D = γw
∞∑
j=1
(1− γw)jdj, and H = γw
∞∑
j=0
(1− γw)jhj . (18)
Perfect competition in the financial sector implies that the representative financial
15Analogous conditions must hold at home and abroad.
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intermediary breaks even on new contracts, such that
V0 = sup
V
{B(V ) = (1 + r)I0} . (19)
New firms starts with equity V0, which then evolves according to the state contingent
contract rules κ(V ) = {α(V ), R(V ), τ(V ), V L(V ), V H(V )}, and the sequence of revenue
and death shocks. We focus our analysis on the steady state of the economy, which is
characterized by a unique stationary distribution of firms µ from Proposition 5.1.16
Proposition 5.1 ∃ a unique and ergodic stationary distribution of firms µ.
Constrained entrepreneurs increase their stake in their firm’s future cash flow by
making positive payments to the intermediary, while unconstrained entrepreneurs have
accumulated enough equity through repayments to self-finance their firm. The represen-
tative intermediary holds a portfolio of claims to future cash flows (when B(V ) > 0) and
obligations to finance firms in the future (when B(V ) < 0) worth
∫
B(V )dµ in present
value terms. The financial intermediary makes zero profits because of perfect competi-
tion, which implies that the net-present value of her assets is also zero. In the aggregate,∫
B(V )dµ+Z = 0, where Z can be positive, negative or zero. A positive Z implies that
the intermediary uses entrepreneur deposits (i.e., retained earnings) from her portfolio
of firms to finance workers’ debt. A negative Z implies that the intermediary raises more
deposits from workers to finance her portfolio of firms.17
The financial intermediary’s budget must be balanced each period, which implies
that aggregate entrepreneurs’ deposits evolves according to the following law of motion:
Z ′ = (1 + r)Z +
∫
piτ(V )dµ+ ΓbS − (1 + r)
(∫
R(V )dµ+ ΓI0
)
. (20)
16The existence and ergodicity results for µ depend on the property of the optimal decision rule for
period loan R(V ), which is not a monotone function of V because of the randomization regions. We
discuss how to deal with the non-monotonicity of R(V ) in the appendix.
17Note that since both workers and entrepreneurs face a stochastic death, efficient intermediation
of funds from savers to borrowers requires an infinitely lived institution for record keeping, thereby
providing a rational for the existence of an financial intermediary.
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That is, Z ′ is equal to returns on aggregate entrepreneur deposits (1+r)Z plus aggregate
net-payments from entrepreneurs
∫
piτ(V )dµ and the scrap value of all liquidated firms
ΓbS net of the cost of financing firms’ operation (1 + r)
∫
R(V )dµ and start-up costs of
new firms (1 + r)ΓI0. Aggregate entrepreneur deposits is constant in the steady state,
which implies that Z ′ = Z and the balanced budget equation simplifies to:18
(1 + r)
(∫
R(V )dµ+ ΓI0
)
−
∫
piτ(V )dµ− ΓbS = rZ , (21)
which states that the return on aggregate entrepreneur deposits should be just enough to
offset any mismatch between aggregate payments from and to entrepreneurs. It follows
that the aggregate demand for capital is equal to the aggregate resources required by all
firms plus the sum of fixed costs to start new firms. The aggregate supply of capital is
equal to workers and entrepreneurs’ aggregate net-deposits. It follows that the capital
market clears when ∫
R(V )dµ+ ΓI0 = D + Z . (22)
The labor market clears when aggregate labor hours supplied by workers equal to
the demand for labor by firms, so that:
H =
∫
ndµ . (23)
The intermediate goods markets at home clears when the quantity of intermediates
demanded by the representative final good producer is equal to the quantity supplied
by intermediate good firms:
y(ω) = q(ω) ∀ω ∈ Ω , and y(ωf ) = q(ωf ) ∀ωf ∈ Ωf , (24)
where y(ω) and y(ωf ) are the quantities of domestic and imported goods demanded by
the final good producer, and Ω and Ωf are the sets of intermediate goods available from
18Note that Z is necessarily finite since Z ≤ B(V˜ ) and the optimal firm size is finite.
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domestic and foreign producers, respectively – similar conditions must also hold abroad.
Trade between countries must be balanced, so that the total value of imports is equal
to the total value of exports times the exchange rate X:19
∫
Ωf
y(ωf )p(ωf )dωf = X
∫
Ω∗
y(ω∗)p(ω∗)dω∗ , (25)
where p(ω) and p(ωf ) are the prices of domestic and imported intermediates goods,
respectively. The final good market clears when total production equals aggregate con-
sumption of workers and entrepreneurs plus investment:20 That is,
Y = Cw + Ce +K, (26)
where total capital expenditure K, aggregate consumption by workers, Cw, and by
entrepreneurs, Ce, are given by
K =
∫
kdµ+ ΓeIE + ΓI0 − ΓbS , Cw = rD + wH , and Ce = pi
∫
F (R)dµ− pi
∫
τdµ .
The definition of the worldwide stationary equilibrium follows:
Definition 5.2 (Worldwide stationary equilibrium) A worldwide stationary equi-
librium consists of decision rules {h(d), cw(d), d′(d)} for workers, a contract κ(V ) be-
tween entrepreneurs and the financial intermediary, an initial contract state V0, wage
rates {w,w∗}, interest rates {r, r∗}, prices for intermediate goods {p(ω), pf (ω)} and
{p(ω∗), pf (ω∗)}; and an exchange rate X, such that in each country
1. h(d), cw(d), and d
′(d) maximizes the workers’ value function U(d)
2. κ(V ) maximizes the value of the firm W (V )
3. the financial intermediary breaks even on new contracts (equation 19)
19Note that a condition concerning arbitrage between the home and foreign final good is not necessary
as the final good cannot be traded.
20Refer to the on-line appendix for a proof that Walras’s law holds in this economy.
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4. the financial intermediary’s budget is balanced every period (equation 20)
5. the labor and capital markets clear (equations 23 and 22)
6. the intermediate good markets clear (equation 24)
7. trade is balanced (equation 25)
Proposition 5.3 ∃ a worldwide stationary equilibrium.
6 Numerical analysis
Once the value function W (V ) and the decision rule for loan size R(V ) are known, the
remaining decision rules can be expressed in closed form as functions of R(V ). Given
the initial firm size V0 and the law of motion for V , we can simulate the life-cycle of a
large number of firms to estimate the stationary distribution of firms.21
6.1 Parameterization
Let the instantaneous utility function for the workers be u(c, h) = ln(c)+λ ln(1−h).22 We
simplify the analysis by considering a world of symmetric countries in which intermediate
goods are produced with constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas production technology:
G(k, n) = kηknηn , with ηn = 1 − ηk. The final good is assembled using a constant
elasticity of substitution (CES) production function, also with constant returns to scale.
The final good producer maximizes its profit given by:
(∫
Ω
y(ω)
σ−1
σ dω +
∫
Ωf
y(ωf )
σ−1
σ dωf
) σ
σ−1
−
∫
Ω
y(ω)p(ω)dω−X
∫
Ωf
y(ωf )p(ωf )dωf (27)
21The code to solve and simulate the model is written in object-oriented Python using the Scipy
library, and is available from the authors.
22This functional form implies closed-form solutions for the aggregate supply of labor and aggregate
deposits given the workers’ demographic assumption, which simplifies the numerical implementation
and reduces the computational burden–see Smith and Wang (2006) for more details.
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where σ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between varieties; and the assumption that
countries are symmetric implies that the exchange rate X is equal to 1.
A period in the model is 1 year. We begin by fixing five parameters: The worker
death rate γw is chosen so that the average working life of workers is 50 years. The
iceberg cost of exporting is set to 40 percent, which is in line with previous studies such
as Anderson and van Wincoop (2004). The probability of a high revenue shock pi is 0.5,
which produces investment volatility roughly in line with studies of firm dynamics such
as Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006); and the salvage value S is set to 80 percent of the
set-up cost I0. We set the elasticity of substitution between intermediates to σ = 6,
which is consistent with Broda and Weinstein (2006).23
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]
Given the above, the six remaining parameters are jointly chosen to match the fol-
lowing six moments: a labor income share of 60 percent, an average working time of 35
percent, an interest rate of 4 percent, an exit and entry rate of 6.3 percent (in line with
Lee and Mukoyama (2008)), a share of exporters of 27 percent in line with Bernard,
Jensen, Redding, and Schott (2007), and an exporter start rate of 3 percent (in line
with Ruhl and Willis (2008)).24 Table 1 summarizes the parametrization. After solving
the model, we simulate the life of 310, 000 firms from which we compute the statistics
reported in Table 2 and the figures discussed in the next sub-sections.
6.2 Aggregate statistics
Table 2 shows that, in the aggregate, the consumption-to-output and investment-to-
output ratios are roughly in line with data, which principally follows from targeting the
labor income share and labor hours. The export-to-output ratio is 8.3 percent, which is
23The study by Simonovska and Waugh (2010) suggests a lower value, around 4, for the elasticity of
substitution, and results for an economy with σ = 4 are qualitatively comparable.
24The exporter start rate is the percentage of non-exporting firms starting to export in the next
period.
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in line with the US experience over the last four decades.25
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]
Table 2 shows that the average exporter is four times larger (in terms of labor and
capital) than the average domestic firm. This is due to two effects: First, the contract
requires that entrepreneurs have a large enough stake in their firms to obtain a large
enough loan to pay the export costs–i.e., a firm must be in good financial health to
export. Second, entrepreneurs’ access to credit increases after export begins. Figure 3
shows that there is a large increase in the loan size R(V ) once firms export, which
implies that the financial conditions faced by firms improve after they start exporting.
The causality between firm access to credit and export status goes in both directions in
our model, highlighting the difficulty of disentangling these effects empirically.
6.3 Firm and exporter dynamics
Our results on firm dynamics are qualitatively similar to those from Quadrini (2004),
and Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006). Panel (a) of Figure 4 shows that the hazard
rate of exit is high for young firms and then decreases with firm age. On average, 1.2
percent of all firms are liquidated every period, which accounts for about 20 percent of
all exiting firms. Panels (b) and (c) of Figure 4 plot the mean and standard deviation of
investment for firms of a given age, and show that younger firms experience faster albeit
more volatile growth than older ones.26
[FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE]
We begin the discussion of exporter dynamics with an example. Figure 5 plots the
life-cycle of three firms taken from our sample of simulated firms. Firm 1 gains access
to export markets at age 17, from which time it continues to grow until it reaches its
25The export share is affected by the elasticity of substitution for intermediate goods. Using the same
targets, we obtain an export to output ratio that is about 1.5 times larger for an economy with σ = 4.
26Given the full depreciation assumption, we define firm investment as the change in loan size from
one period to the next, Rt+1/Rt.
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efficient size at age 25 and finally exogenously exits at age 27. It takes 14 years for Firm
2 to accumulate enough equity to start exporting, but exits export markets after two
years. Firm 3 never grows nearly large enough to export, and is liquidated at age 23.
[FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE]
The long-term financial contract plays a critical role in shaping both the extensive
and intensive margins of trade. Consider first the extensive margin: 27 percent of all
firms export, and about 3 percent of domestic firms begin exporting each period. New
exporters, which represent about 10 percent of all exporters (Panel (a) of Figure 6),
are about a third of the size of incumbents (Table 2); and a large fraction of these new
exporters–almost 35 percent–stop exporting after one year. The remaining 65 percent
are less likely to exit during their second year exporting, and their conditional survival
rate in international markets continues to rise until they only face the exogenous exit
rate (Panel (b) of Figure 6).
These results follow from the property that new exporters are close to the export
lottery region, so that exit from export markets following a low revenue shock is very
likely. But since firms grow on average (the sub-martingale property of V ), older ex-
porters tend to be larger in terms of equity, and are therefore further away from the
export lottery region. Ultimately, unconstrained exporters only exit exogenously. The
high (endogenous) exit rate of young exporters also implies that the average sales of
exiting and new exporters are approximately the same–their size differs only by 3.8 per-
cent in terms of resources R. This is also apparent from Figure 3, showing that equity
of both new exporters and exiting ones is close to VE.
[FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE]
Now consider the intensive margin: Young exporters are relatively smaller (Panel (a)
of Figure 7), and grow faster than established ones, but their growth is more volatile.
Panels (c) and (d) of Figure 7 plot the mean and standard deviation of investment of
exporters conditional on the length of their export spell. The average growth rate of a
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new exporter is 12 percent and is close to zero after ten years. The standard deviation
of investment, however, is almost two times higher for a new exporter than a ten year
old one. This implies that the investment of established exporters is much less sensitive
to their cash-flows. Most exports are produced by large and financially unconstrained
exporters. Panel (a) of Figure 7 plots the exports of the different age groups as a
percentage of unconstrained firms’ exports; and panel (b) of Figure 7 shows that new
exporters (up to six years old) only account for 30 percent of total exports.
[FIGURE 7 ABOUT HERE]
In sum, the impact of financial constraints on international trade in our model stems
from the properties of the optimal financial contract that shapes firm dynamics. Changes
in the economic environment, such as a lowering of trade barriers, have a non-trivial
impact on both the extensive and intensive margin of trade by changing the contract
terms between investors and entrepreneurs; and on the aggregate through the general
equilibrium. For example, we find that a 20 percent decrease in the variable trade cost
increases the share of exporters and exports as a fraction of total output. Following the
reform, firms grow faster, begin exporting at a younger age (and at a smaller size), the
survival of young exporters in international market is lower, and aggregate output is
about one percentage point higher.
7 Discussion
Much of the recent focus in the international trade literature has been on exporter
dynamics, which remains an area marked by important puzzles. Most notably, a Melitz
model in which firms face persistent productivity shocks and sunk cost of exporting–in
the spirit of Hopenhayn (1992)–cannot account simultaneously for firms’ low entry rate
into export markets together with the higher exit rate of young exporters (Ruhl and
Willis (2008), and Arkolakis (2010)). It is also at odds with the empirical observation
that average sales of firms exiting from, and entering into international markets are
approximately the same (Eaton et al., 2011).
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These inconsistencies arise because in a model such as the one in Ruhl and Willis
(2008), the export sunk cost must be paid every time a firm exits and subsequently
wishes to re-enter export markets.27 That is, a firm starts exporting when it receives
a high enough productivity shock and pays the sunk export cost. When productivity
reverts to its original level, the firm continues exporting to avoid paying the sunk costs
in the near future in case it receives another high productivity shock. This creates a
certain momentum after entry into export markets and implies that the hazard rate of
survival decreases with the export spell. Another implication is that exiting exporters
must have a much lower productivity (and therefore size) than new exporters.
Although there is widespread empirical evidence that exporters tend to be more
productive than domestic firms, productivity may not be the only source of selection
into export markets. Not all highly productive firms, especially the young ones, export.
Our model abstracts from the effects of firm productivity differentials on firm selection
into export markets, and focuses on a different selection mechanism: the effects of
financial constraints that arise when financial markets are incomplete because of private
information.
To better understand the role of private information in shaping exporter dynamics,
consider an extension of our model in which the production function of intermediate
goods firms is exp(z)G(k, n).28 Assume that firm productivity z is publicly observable
and follows a time-invariant Markov process with transition probability Φ(z′, z), such
that z ∈ [zmin, zmax] and |zmin|, zmax < ∞. New firms draw their productivity from an
initial distribution Φ0(z).
29
Let V ′z′ be the state-contingent continuation value to the entrepreneur, and rewrite
27A sunk cost is required in this model to quantitatively matched the fraction of firms that export.
28In this version of the model, the idiosyncratic revenue shock θ could then be interpreted as a demand
shock (e.g., Arkolakis (2010)).
29Note that in our baseline model, firms face a publicly observed binary idiosyncratic productivity
shock (the death shock), such that z′ = 1 and z′ = 0 with probability 1 − γe and γe, respectively,
conditional on z = 1 in the previous period; conditional on z = 0 in the previous period, z′ = 0 with
probability one.
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the value function of a i-type firm conditional on z 6= 0 as
Ŵi(V, z) = max
τ,R,V H
z′ ,V
L
z′
piFi(R, z)− (1 + r)R + βE[(1− pi)W (V Lz′ ) + piW (V Hz′ )|z] (28)
s.t.V = pi(Fi(R, z)− τ) + βE[piV Hz′ + (1− pi)V Lz′ |z] (29)
Fi(R, z)− τ + βE[V Hz′ |z] ≥ Fi(R, z) + βE[V Lz′ |z] (30)
τ ≤ Fi(R, z) (31)
V Hz′ , V
L
z′ ≥ 0. (32)
where i ∈ {D,E} and β = 1/(1 + r). The optimal continuation values V ′(θˆ, z′, V, z)
to the entrepreneur are now functions of the current productivity z, equity V , report θˆ
and the realization of next period’s shock z′. Our previous results are largely unchanged
simply replacing V L and V H by E[V Lz′ |z] and E[V Hz′ |z], respectively.30
The effect of financial frictions relative to productivity shocks on exporter dynamics
depends on the volatility (and persistence) of each shock. Clearly, when zmin → zmax,
only financial frictions matter, as in our baseline model. When θH → θL, financial
frictions play no role and the productivity process determines exporter dynamics. Access
to credit and productivity matter when (private) revenue and (public) productivity
shocks have a wide enough support.31 A firm stops exporting as V → 0, no matter how
productive it is. Similarly, even an unconstrained firm stops exporting as z → 0.
To focus on the role of productivity shocks, assume that θH → θL, so that there are
no financial frictions. Assume further that the Markov process for z is the discrete ap-
proximation of the auto-regressive process for z˜, such that z˜′ = (1−ρ)µ +ρz˜+ , where
 ∼ N(0, σ2 ) and µ shifts the mean. The degree of persistence for firm productivity
is thus captured by ρ. When the productivity process is IID (ρ = 0), the probability
of exiting export markets and the average productivity of exporters are independent of
30Once E[V Lz′ |z] and E[V Hz′ |z] are known, V Lz′ and V Lz′ for all z ∈ [zmin, zmax] can be determined by
maximizing E[W (V L|z)] and E[W (V H |z)] holding constant the respective expected continuation values
to the entrepreneur. Since W (V, z) is strictly concave in V , there is a unique interior solution; and given
Ŵi(V, z), the export and liquidation decisions are exactly as before.
31We assume that ρ is less than 1 when firms are also subject to revenue shocks.
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exporter age. With a unit root process (ρ = 1), firm productivity follows a random
walk. Since all firms below the export threshold exit export markets, this implies that
the probability of exiting export markets is decreasing, and the average productivity
of exporters is increasing in exporter age. Thus, with a persistent productivity process
(0 < ρ < 1), the probability of exiting export markets is decreasing and the average
productivity is increasing in exporter age. Moreover, the rate at which average produc-
tivity increases is also decreasing in exporter age. However, it is well-known that if firms
also face sunk costs – when the cost of exporting is higher for new exporters than for
established ones –, the above conclusions can be reversed depending on the persistence
of the shock and the size of the sunk cost (Ruhl and Willis (2008)).32
Two conclusions emerge: First, persistent (publicly observable) productivity shocks
reinforce the main mechanism driving exporter dynamics derived from our model with
moral hazard. Second, conditional on productivity (age) older (more productive) firms
are larger in terms of sales, more likely to export, and less likely to become liquidated
or exit export markets. Taken together, our findings and the above discussion suggest
that firm productivity and lending relationships could be jointly important in shaping
exporter dynamics. This echoes the conclusions of Cooley and Quadrini (2001), who
show that models combining persistent shocks and financial frictions can account for
firm dynamics.33
Financial markets could also be incomplete because of limited enforcement such as
in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (2004). Consider now
a version of our model with long-term financial contracts that are constrained efficient
under limited enforcement.34 In this model, revenue shocks are observable by everyone.
32Kohn et al. (2011) quantify the effect of financial frictions on new exporter dynamics by contrasting
a model in which firms face productivity shocks and an (exogenous) collateral requirement for their
one period debt to a model in which firm face productivity shocks and sunk costs. Kohn et al. (2011)
show that their model accounts for the downward sloping hazard rate of exit from export markets and
positive, downward-sloping sales growth. However, the impact of financial constraints is unclear. As
pointed out above, the productivity process alone already accounts for these facts in the absence of
sunk costs.
33In particular, the simultaneous dependence of firm dynamics on size conditional on age, and on age
conditional on size.
34This contract is similar to Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (2004) and studied in the context of trade
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Without loss of generality, assume that the contract can be repudiated at no cost, and
that a defaulting entrepreneur can divert the current revenue, but will in that case be
excluded from financial markets in the future. The outside value option of default is then
simply Fi(R) for i ∈ {D,E} after a high revenue shock, and 0 otherwise. The optimal
contract maximizes the value of the joint surplus subject to a no-default Fi(R) − τ +
βV H ≥ Fi(R) rather than an incentive compatibility constraints. In equilibrium, no
entrepreneur chooses to repudiate the contract, and it can be shown than V L(V ) = V <
V H(V ), which implies that firm size never decreases. Thus, conditional on productivity,
limited enforcement cannot alone account for the higher exit rate of young exporters.
Therefore, our results highlight the potentially important role moral hazard plays in
shaping exporters dynamics.
Last, our model shares the same limitation as the Melitz model in that it predicts a
constant export to total sales ratio. This implication is at odds with data (Berman and
He´ricourt, 2010; Iacovone and Javorcik, 2010), and is due to the assumption of a CES
aggregator with iceberg-style variable trade costs. For instance, our model implies that
q∗
q
= (1 + IT )
−σ , (33)
and although new exporters increase their production and exports as they spend more
years in international markets, the composition of their sales remains unchanged. How-
ever, extending our model to include a per-unit cost IˆT of export implies that
q∗
q
=
(
1 + IT +
µ
λ
IˆT
)−σ
, (34)
where µ and λ are the Lagrangian multipliers associated with the resource and produc-
tion constraints (equation (4) and (5)) in the static profit maximization problem solved
by the intermediate producers (problem (6)), respectively.35 It can be shown that µ/λ is
increasing in V when intermediate good producers have access to a decreasing return to
by Wang (2010) and Brooks and Dovis (2011).
35With a per unit cost, the firm resource constraints becomes k + nw + 1(q∗>0)(IE + q
∗IˆT ) ≤ R(V ).
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scale technology, which implies that their export to total sales ratio increases the longer
they export.36 Alternative rationales proposed to account for the increasing export to
total sales ratio include learning both from the demand side (Rauch and Trindade, 2003)
and the supply side (Ruhl and Willis, 2008), as well as convex costs of advertising, which
force exporters to slowly build market share (Arkolakis, 2010).
8 Concluding remarks
There is widespread empirical evidence that financial frictions play an important role in
shaping the growth of young and small firms. There is also growing empirical evidence
that the export decisions of firms are sensitive to the availability of credit. This pa-
per investigates how private information and the long-term financial arrangements that
arise in consequence affect firms’ entry and growth in international markets in general
equilibrium.
Our model predicts that new exporters account only for a small share of total exports,
in line with recent empirical studies. A large fraction of new exporters stop exporting
after one year, while continuing exporters are less likely to exit. Young exporters expe-
rience faster and more volatile growth than established exporters.
Although testing the effect of credit relationships on firm export decisions is beyond
the scope of this paper, we provide new facts in Table 3 about manufacturing firm
finances from the 2003 Survey of Small Business Finances. Consistent with our theory,
we find evidence that exporters are fewer, larger, and less leveraged than non-exporters.
Younger exporters tend to have longer lending relationships with their primary lenders,
and almost all exporters operate under a limited liability status. In contrast, about 60%
of domestic firms operate under limited liability. We also find that nearly all young
exporters use trade credit, and tend to use it more intensively than young domestic
36Per-unit costs of trade are in terms of resources, whereas iceberg costs are in terms of production.
With decreasing returns to scale, the shadow value of resources is diminishing faster than the shadow
value of production. This implies that per-unit trade costs play a smaller role in determining exports
as firms grow and have more resources at their disposal. A more general discussion is contained in the
on-line appendix.
28
firms.
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]
Our theory abstracts from the effects of firm productivity on selection into export
markets. Assessing the joint role of financial market incompleteness and firm productiv-
ity remains an important empirical and theoretical question. Our theory also abstracts
from other forms of credit relationships, such as trade credit with suppliers. Given
the pervasive use of the relatively expensive trade credit among exporters, it is likely
that trade credit is an important alternative source of credit for financially constrained
exporters.
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A Miscellaneous proofs
Proposition A.1 There exists a point Vdx such that ŴD(V ) > ŴE(V ) for all V ∈
[0, Vdx), and ŴD(V ) < ŴE(V ) for all V ∈ (Vdx, V˜ ].
From our assumptions on Fi(·) for i ∈ {D,E}, it can be shown that FD(R) = f(R)1−1/σA
and FE(R) = f(R − IE)1−1/σA∗ which are both strictly increasing and concave as long
as the span of control parameter is less then σ/(σ − 1). This implies that the current
period expected cash flow piFi(R)− (1+r)R is also a strictly increasing, strictly concave
function on [0, R˜i] for i ∈ {D,E}. It follows that ŴD(V ) defined over [0, V˜D] and ŴE(V )
defined over [0, V˜ ] are both strictly increasing and concave. It remains to be shown that
ŴE(V ) is lower than ŴD(V ) for all V < Vdx and vice versa – i.e., there is a unique
crossing point Vdx. Without loss of generality, let ŴD(V ) = ŴD(V˜ )∀V > V˜D. Assume
that participating in international trade is profitable, so that {FE(R˜) − (1 + r)R˜} >
{FD(R˜D) − (1 + r)R˜D}, which implies that ŴE(V˜ ) > ŴD(V˜ ). Given the participation
constraint (equation 7) and the requirement that V L(V ) and V H(V ) be non-negative,
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V L(V ) and V H(V ) force the continuation tend to zero, as V tends to 0. It follows that
VH − VL also tends to 0 as V tends to 0, which reduced R(V ) to maintain incentive
compatibility (equation 8). This implies that ŴD(V ) tends to βS as V tends to 0.
Using a similar argument for exporters, R(V ) tends to IE as V tends to 0, which implies
that ŴE(V ) tends to βS − IE as V tends to 0. The property that ŴD(V ) and ŴE(V )
are increasing and concave together with the above yields the results
Proof of Proposition 3.1: Partitions of the domain for W (V ): From Proposi-
tion A.1, Ŵ (0) < S and Ŵ (V ) > S for any 0 < V < V˜ (otherwise the contract would
not be feasible)), so that Vr > 0. Furthermore, Ŵ
′
E(V ) > Ŵ
′
D(V )∀V < V˜ , and it fol-
lows that VD < VE by the strict concavity of Ŵi(V ) for i ∈ {D,E}. Finally, because
Ŵ ′E(V˜ ) = 0, it must be the case that VE < V˜ . We assume that VD > Vr, which must
hold if there is to be any non-exporting firms in the economy.
Export lottery : ŴE(Vdx) = ŴD(Vdx) from Proposition A.1, which, together with
the concavity of ŴD and the strict concavity of ŴE on [0, V˜ ] imply that VD < Vdx <
VE. It follows that the function max{ŴD(V ), ŴE(V )} defined over [0, V˜ ] is convex on
[VD, VE] ⊂ (0, V˜ ). This implies that the joint surplus can be improved by making the
export decision random. That is, whenever a firm reaches a size V ∈ [VD, VE], a risk
neutral entrepreneur accepts a lottery with which her firm reaches VE with probability
δ(V ) = (V − VD)/(VE − VD), or VD with probability (1− δ(V )). The boundaries of this
export region, [VD, VE], are determined such that the tangent of ŴD(V ) at VD is equal
to the tangent of ŴE(V ) at VE.
Liquidation lottery : A positive scrap value S implies that the financial intermediary
may have an incentive to liquidate the firm if its value falls below a threshold level Vr. Fol-
lowing the same argument as for the export lottery above, the function max{S, ŴD(V )}
defined over [0, VD] is convex. The joint surplus can be improved by randomizing the
liquidation decision. Optimally, Vr = supV {Ŵ (V )−S = V Ŵ ′(V )}, such that whenever
the equity of a firm falls below Vr, the financial intermediary offers the entrepreneur a
lottery with which her firm is liquidated with probability α(V ) = (Vr − V )/Vr or kept
in operation with probability 1− α.
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Concavity of W (V ): Since Ŵi(V ) for i ∈ {D,E} are each increasing and concave on
[0, V˜i], any convex combination of the two functions and S on [0, V˜ ] is also increasing
and concave, which implies that W (V ) is increasing and concave. Furthermore, from
the definition of the liquidation and export lotteries, W (V ) is strictly increasing and
linear on [0, S]∪ [VD, VE], and strictly increasing and concave on (Vr, VD)∪ (VE, V˜ ).
Proof of Proposition 4.1: Partition the domain of the contract [0, V˜ ] in five parts
[0, Vr)∪ [Vr, VD]∪ (VD, VE)∪ [VE, V˜ )∪{V˜ }. Given the expression for V L(V ) and V H(V ),
it follows that E(V ′|V ) = V/β when V ∈ [Vr, VD] ∪ [VE, V˜ ).37 When V = V˜ , the firm
is unconstrained and there is no need to provide any incentives to report the truth (as
all the revenue go to the entrepreneur), and hence V L = V H = V˜ , so E(V ′|V˜ ) = V˜ .
Whenever V H(V ) ∈ (VD, VE) or V L(V ) ∈ (VD, VE), optimality of the lottery implies that
the entrepreneur is indifferent between her current level V and the expected payoff of
the lottery next period. It follows that E(V ′|V ∈ [0, Vr)) = E(V ′|V ∈ (VD, VE)) = V/β.
B Existence of a general equilibrium
Given interest rate r and wage w, perfect competition in the financial market implies
that new firms start with equity V0. Consider the sequence (Xt)t≥0 of equity levels from
a single firm indefinitely replaced by a new one upon liquidation or exogenous exit, with
X0 = V0. It is clear (Xt)t≥0 is a sequence of random variables, and its evolution depends
on the properties of the optimal contracts and on the sequence of shocks – liquidation
lottery, export lottery, revenue shock, and exogenous exit.
Our proof of existence consists of four parts. The first part show that X = (Xt)t≥0
is a time-homogeneous Markov chain such that
Xt+1 = Tω(Xt, t), (t)t≥0 ∼ φω ∈P(Z), X0 = V0 ∈ S (35)
37Here we assume that repayments τ are equal to all revenues Fi(R(V )) for all V < V˜ . In our
numerical analysis we have τ < Fi(R(V )) for some V with V
H(V ) = V˜ , but the sub-martingale
property still holds.
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where Tω : S × Z → S is a collection of measurable functions indexed by ω ∈ Ω
the parameter space, (t)
∞
t=1 is a sequence of independent random shocks with (joint)
distribution φω, and S and Z are the state space and the probability space respectively.
The second part establishes that the Markov chain has a unique distribution of firms,
which can be attained in a finite number of periods starting from any initial distribution.
The third part establish that the stationary distribution of firms is continuous in ω.
The last part defines a continuous mapping of Ω on itself and apply Schauder Fixed-
Point Theorem, which, together with the first three results and the condition that Ω be
compact and convex set, implies that this mapping admits at least one fixed point.38
Proposition B.1 (Step 1) X is a time-homogeneous Markov chain on a general state
space.
Equip the state space S with a boundedly compact, separable, metrizable topology
B(S). Let (Z,Z ) be the measure space for the shocks. Let A be any subset of B(S).
It follows for any x ∈ {x : Vr < x < VD and V L(x) < Vr}
P (x,A) =

(1− γ)(1− pi)α(V L(x)) + γ if A = {V0}
(1− γ)(1− pi)(1− α(V L(x)) if A = {Vr}
(1− γ)pi if A = {V H(x)}
0 otherwise
(36)
For any x ∈ {x : Vr < x < VD and Vr ≤ V L(x) ≤ VD and V H(x) ≤ VD}
P (x,A) =

γ if A = {V0}
(1− γ)(1− pi) if A = {V L(x)}
(1− γ)pi if A = {V H(x)}
0 otherwise
(37)
38Our proof of existence is similar to the one in Verani (2013) who studies a closed economy version
of this model.
32
For any x ∈ {x : Vr < x < VD and Vr ≤ V L(x) ≤ VD and V H(x) ≥ VD}
P (x,A) =

γ if A = {V0}
(1− γ)(1− pi) if A = {V L(x)}
(1− γ)piδ(V H(x)) if A = {VE}
(1− γ)pi(1− δ(V H(x))) if A = {VD}
0 otherwise
(38)
For any x ∈ {x : VE < x < V˜ and V L(x) ≤ VE and VE ≤ V H(x) < V˜ }
P (x,A) =

γ if A = {V0}
(1− γ)(1− pi)δ(V L(x)) if A = {VE}
(1− γ)(1− pi)(1− δ(V L(x))) if A = {VD}
(1− γ)pi if A = {V H(x)}
0 otherwise
(39)
For any x ∈ {x : VE < x < V˜ and VE ≤ V L(x) ≤ V˜ and V H(x) ≥ V˜ }
P (x,A) =

γ if A = {V0}
(1− γ)(1− pi) if A = {V L(x)}
(1− γ)pi if A = {V˜ }
0 otherwise
(40)
And for x = {V˜ }
P (x,A) =

γ if A = {V0}
(1− γ) if A = {V˜ }
0 otherwise
(41)
For each A ∈ B(S), P (·, A) is a non-negative function on B(S), and for each x ∈ S,
P (x, ·) is a probability measure on B(S). Therefore, for any initial distribution ψ, the
stochastic process X defined on S∞ is a time-homogeneous Markov chain.
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Proposition B.2 (Step 2) X is globally stable.
Let M denote the corresponding Markov operator, and letP(S) denote the collection
of firms distribution generated by M for a given initial distribution. 39
Write the stochastic kernel P with the density representation p so that P (x, dy) =
p(x, y)dy for all x ∈ S. The Dobrushin coefficient α(p) of a stochastic kernel p is defined
by
α(p) := min
{∫
p(x, y) ∧ p(x′, y)dy : (x, x′) ∈ S × S
}
(42)
(P(S),M) is globally stable if (ψMt)t≥0 → ψ∗M where ψ∗ ∈P(S) is the unique fixed
point of (P(S),M). This occurs if the Markov operator is a uniform contraction of
modulus 1−α(p) on P(S) whenever α(p) > 0. A firm dies with a fixed, exogenous and
independent probability γ each period, and is instantaneously replaced by a new one of
size V0. Therefore,
P (x, {V0}) ≥ 0 ∀ x ∈ S. (43)
Equation (11.15) and Exercise (11.2.24) in Stachurski (2009) yield α(p) > γ. By
Stachurski (2009, Th. 11.2.21), this implies
||ψM− ψ′M||TV ≤ (1− γ)||ψ − ψ′|| (44)
for every pair ψ, ψ′ in P(Z), and where TV indicates the total variation norm.
Proposition B.3 (Step 3) ψ∗ is continuous in ω.
39Note that Stokey, Lucas, and Prescott (1989, Theorem 12.12) fails to apply in this case because the
stochastic kernel is not monotone on [Vr, a] where a is such that V
L(a) = Vr. For instance, consider
the function f(x) = x. From the above,∫
[Vr,a]
P (x, dy)y
= (1− γe){(1− p)[α(V L(x))V0 + (1− α(V L(x)))Vr] + pV H(x)}+ γeV0
= (1− γe)[(1− p)V0(1− V L(x)/Vr) + (1− p)V L(x) + pV H(x)] + γeV0
= (1− γe)[(1− p)V0α(V L(x)) + x/β] + γeV0
Which is generally not increasing. When x falls below a, the probability of liquidation α(x) becomes
non-zero in case of a θ = 0. The liquidation rule sends x to V0 (as the firm regenerate), which can be
larger than Vr and V
H(x) so that the lower the x, the higher the expected value of next period x.
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Parametric continuity of X follows if the conditions of LeVan and Stachurski (2007,
Proposition2) are satisfied.40 Without loss of generality, we only only consider the case of
symmetric countries in which case the exchange rate is 1, and ω = {r, w}. Consider again
the state space S equipped with a boundedly compact, separable, metrizable topology,
(Z,Z ) a measure space, and P(Z) the collection of probabilities on (Z,Z ). From the
above, the model can be written as
Xt+1 = Tω(Xt, t), where t ∼ ψω ∈P(Z), ∀t ∈ N (45)
where (t)
∞
t=1 independently distributed, and Tω : S × Z → S is measurable.41
Given prices ω, the stochastic kernel can be written as Pω(x,B) := ψω{z ∈ Z :
Tω(x, z) ∈ B}, and given the parameter space Ω, the family of stochastic kernel is
{Pω : ω ∈ Ω}. Let N be any subspace of Ω, and define Λ(ω) := {µ ∈P(S) : µ = µPω}
the collection of invariant distribution corresponding indexed by ω.
Proposition B.4 (LeVan and Stachurski (2007)) If Λ(ω) = {µω}, then ω 7→ µω is
continuous on N if the following four conditions are satisfied:42
1. the map N 3 ω 7→ Tω(x, z) ∈ S is continuous for each pair (x, z) ∈ S × Z
2. for each compact C ⊂ S, there is a K <∞ with
∫
d(Tω(x, z), Tω(x
′, z))ψω(dz) ≤ Kd(x, x′),∀x, x′ ∈ C, ∀ω ∈ N (46)
3. ∃ a Lyapunov function V ∈ L (S), λ ∈ (0, 1), and L ∈ [0,∞) s.t. ∀ω ∈ N
PωV (x) :=
∫
V (Tω(x, z))ψω(dz) ≤ λV (x) + L ∀x ∈ S (47)
40LeVan and Stachurski (2007, Proposition 2) is an application of LeVan and Stachurski (2007,
Theorem 1) of which Stokey et al. (1989, Theorem 12.13) is a special case.
41Here, (t)
∞
t=1 = ({Dγ,t, Dpi,t, Dα,t, Dδ,t})∞t=1 where each Di for i ∈ {γ, pi, α, δ} is a binary i.i.d.
random variable corresponding to the death, revenue, and liquidation and export lotteries, respectively.
42This is another abuse of notation. It is customary to use V (x) to denote a Lyapunov function.
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4. ω 7→ ψω is continuous in total variation norm.
That Λ(ω) is nonempty, and Λ(ω) = {µω} for each ω ∈ N follows from Proposition B.2.
Condition (1) requires the optimal value function W (x) to be continuous in ω which
follows from Berge’s theorem. Condition (4) holds as the shocks are independent and
the probability of liquidation is α(x) = (x−Vr)/Vr and export δ(x) = (x−VD)/(VE−VD)
are both continuous in ω since Vr, VD, and VE are continuous in ω from condition (1).
To show condition (2) holds, define again a 3 V L(a) = Vr, and b 3 V H(b) ≥
V˜ . Pick any x, x′ ∈ C ⊂ [Vr, a). Without loss of generality assume x > x′ so that
α(V L(x′)) > α(V L(x)). By noting that α(V L(x′)) − α(V L(x)) = (V L(x′) − V L(x))/Vr,
and x = β[pV H(x) + (1− p)V L(x)] at optimum, it follows easily that
∫
d(Tω(x, z), Tω(x
′, z))ψω(dz)
< |pV H(x) + (1− p)V L(x)− pV H(x′)− (1− p)V L(x′)|
=
1
β
|x− x′| = 1
β
d(x, x′).
The above inequality also holds for any x, x′ ∈ C ⊂ [a, b). Last, recall that V L(x) =
(x− pF (R(x)))/β. It follows for any x, x′ ∈ C ⊂ [b, V˜ )
∫
d(Tω(x, z), Tω(x
′, z))ψω(dz)
< (1− p)|V L(x)− V L(x′)|
=
(1− p)
β
|x− x′| = (1− p)
β
d(x, x′).
It remains to show condition (3) holds. Pick V (x) = x which is a Lyapunov function
(since S is boundedly compact). Then,
Pωx =

(1− γe){(1− p)[α(V L(x))V0 + (1− α(V L(x)))Vr] + pV H(x)}1[Vr,a)(x)
+ [pV H(x) + (1− p)V L(x)]1[a,b)(x)
+ V˜ 1(x=V˜ )(x)}+ γeV0
(48)
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Pick any x ∈ [Vr, a) so that Vr ≤ x ≤ V H(x). Then,
Pωx < (1− p)(1− α(V L(x)))Vr + pV H(x) + [(1− p)α(V L(x)) + γe]V0
≤ (1− p)Vr + pV H(x) + V0
≤ λx+ sup
ω∈N
V0 = λV (x) + L
The same inequality holds for any x ∈ [a, b), since V L(x) < x < V H(x). Last, when
x = V˜ ,
Pωx = (1− γe)V˜ + γeV0
≤ λx+ sup
ω∈N
V0
Proposition B.5 (Step 4) There exists an equilibrium
Using equations 22, 23, and 26, define the mapping
f(ω) =

∫
R(V, ω)dµ(ω) + Γ(ω)I0 −D(ω)− Z(ω)∫
n(ω)dµ(ω)−H
piF (R(V, ω), ω)− Cw(ω)− Ce(ω)−K(ω)

such that f : Ω 7→ R3, and where
Z(ω) = − ∫ B(V, ω)dµ(ω)− Γb(ω)S
K(ω) =
∫
k(ω)dµ(ω) + Γe(ω)IE + Γ(ω)I0 − Γb(ω)S
Cw(ω) = D(ω)r(ω) +H(ω)w(ω)
Ce(ω) = pi
∫
F (R(V, ω), ω)dµ(ω)− pi ∫ τ(ω)dµ(ω)
Prices r and w must each be positive and greater than zero. Without loss of generality,
assume that r and w are bounded above by arbitrarily large but finite numbers r¯andw¯.
It follows that the set Ω is compact and convex. Define the mapping Φ : Ω 7→ Ω such
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that
Φ(ω) = argmax
ω∈Ω
−||f(ω)||2 (49)
From Proposition B.2 and Proposition B.5, the maximand is continuous in ω so that the
correspondence Φ is also continuous. Applying the Schauder Fixed-Point (Stokey et al.,
1989, Theorem 17.4) yields the results.
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Table 1: Parameter values
Parameters
σ Elasticity of substitution 6
βˆ Workers’ discount rate 0.96
λ Elasticity of leisure 2.35
γw Workers’ death probability 0.02
ηk Capital share 0.20
I0 Setup investment 0.278
S Salvage value 0.8 × I0
IT Variable export cost 0.40
IE Fixed export cost 0.013
pi Probability of high/low shock 0.5
γe Firm exogenous exit rate 0.048
44
Table 2: Steady state moments (in percent)
Targeted: Not targeted:
Interest rate 4 Consumption/Output 79.1
Hours worked 35 Investment/Output 20.9
Labor income share 59.7 Export/Output 8.3
Entry/exit rate 6.3 Relative size of entrants 15.2
Entry rate in export market 3.1 Exit rate from export market after 1 year 32.5
Share of exporters 26.8 Domestic firm size relative to exporters 27
45
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Figure 1: Timing
Liquidation
Death shock Revenue shock
Resource advanced Repayment / Continuation valueProduction / ReportExport
t t+1
Figure 2: The optimal financial contract
(a) Value function (b) Continuation values
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Figure 3: Financial characteristics of the contract
(a) Period loan, R(V ) (b) Debt and dividend (c) Conditional investment
Figure 4: Firm dynamics
(a) Hazard rate of exit (b) Mean investment (c) Std. Dev. investment
Figure 5: The life cycle of firms
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Figure 6: The extensive margin of exporter dynamics
(a) Fraction of exporters by age (b) Export markets survival rate
Figure 7: The intensive margin of exporter dynamics
(a) Relative size of exporters (b) Share of total exports
(c) Mean investment rate (d) Investment std. dev.
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